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This paper links the bursting of the housing asset price bubble around 2007
in the U.S. to the instability that arose in financial markets with the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and both of these to the Great
Recession and the unconventional monetary policy that followed. Similar
narratives about the Stock Market Crash of 1929, the Crash of 1987 and the
Internet Bubble of 2000 are briefly presented to show their evolving financial
nature, describe the financial instabilities produced by them and their costs and,
finally examine the responses initiated, primarily, by monetary policy. This
analytical synopsis of the four best-known U.S. asset bubble crashes guides us
to an articulation of a few basic lessons learned.
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I. Introduction
The U.S. economic downturn that resulted from the Global Financial
Crisis of 2007-09 was the longest since World War II. It is named the
Great Recession in contrast to the Great Depression of 1929. It began
in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. Real GDP fell by 4.3 %
from its peak during the 4th quarter of 2007 to its trough in June 2009.
The unemployment rate increased from around 5% in December 2007
to around 10% in June 2009; this translated to more than 15 million
workers permanently losing their jobs.
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Other indicators of the economic severity of the Great Recession
include a 30% drop in housing prices; a 57% decline in the S&P 500
Index and a 20% decrease in the net worth of households. Equally
dramatic were the economic and financial consequences of the Global
Financial Crisis around the world, particularly in the Eurozone where
some countries experienced a sovereign debt crisis that followed the
Global Financial Crisis. Kolb (2011) offers a comprehensive analysis
of the Great Recession documented by numerous references focusing on
its diverse components.
Beyond the dramatic economic and financial developments that
occurred during the duration of the Great Recession, the economic
recovery that followed it defied, repeatedly, economic projections for
a return to normal growth. Figure 1 illustrates how gradual the recovery
has been and how the real potential output was adjusted downwards to
reflect a slower rate of annual growth than the one experienced during
the two decades prior to the crisis.
This evidence substantiates that financial crises are fundamentally
different from regular business cycles. While business cycles portray
relatively small deviations from a long-term trend in real growth for an
economy that remains close to an equilibrium, the impact of some
financial crises affects both the trend of output and its deviations both
quantitatively and also in terms of length of time. Numerically, the
average annual U.S. real GDP growth post the Great Recession, from
2009 to 2017 has fluctuated around 2.2% versus fluctuations around a
3.8% trend growth from the early 1950s to 2006. This dramatic swing
in economic activity illustrates the substantial economic costs of the
Global Financial Crisis.
This paper relates the bursting of the housing bubble to the subprime
mortgage crisis and the turmoil in financial markets that caused a credit
freeze and a serious decline in real economic activity. Both, the housing
bubble bursting and the financial instability that resulted, produced the
Great Recession, and induced monetary policy to employ new tools to
restore financial stability. Similar narratives about the Stock Market
Crash of 1929, the Crash of 1987 and the Internet Bubble of 2000 are
presented to show the evolving financial nature of asset bubbles,
describe the financial instabilities produced by them, examine the
economic costs of financial turmoil and, finally, explore the responses
initiated by monetary policy. The next three sections address the
Housing Bubble of 2000-2010, in some detail, and the following three
sections review rapidly three other famous bubbles. This analytical
synopsis of the four best-known U.S. asset bubbles concludes, in the last
section, with an articulation of few basic lessons learned from the
bursting of asset price bubbles.
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FIGURE 1.— The Recovery from the Global Financial Crisis Was
Very Slow

II. The Housing Bubble of 2000-2007
The classic book that first addressed the importance of asset price
bubbles and related them to market manias and crashes is Kindleberger
(1978). This book and its latest seventh edition of Kindleberger and
Aliber (2015) have refined the historical analysis but did not expand the
scope of policy issues. From the first edition of this book to its most
recent one, new bubbles were added to illustrate their continued
presence in the economic landscape. What emerges from the
Kindleberger and Aliber analysis is that asset bubbles have been
occurring for the past few centuries across many countries. Often, they
cause limited macroeconomic problems as in the case of the famous
tulip bubble. However, in certain occurrences these bubbles may lead
to an economic depression, as in the case of the 1929 Stock Market
Bubble Crash or to a major recession as in the 2007 U.S. Housing
Market Bubble Crash. Economic theorists and policymakers would like
to know when the bursting of asset bubbles is followed by serious
economic losses and when the crashing just restores market equilibrium
with no economic repercussions elsewhere. Central banks are concerned

38

Multinational Finance Journal

with asset bubbles because of the risks associated with their crashes.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) offer a more comprehensive quantitative
analysis of economic crises than that of Kindleberger and Aliber (2015).
The scope of their book is chronologically very long going back to
pre-1800 and broad in terms of countries, covering as many as 66.
Crises of various varieties are examined, such as inflation, currency
crashes, banking crises, sovereign debt crises and others. Many
economic crises are unrelated to asset price bubbles, but the authors
describe how some banking crises develop from the bursting of stock
market bubbles or housing bubbles.
This paper reviews four famous asset crashes: the first one is about
housing and the other three are about the stock market. Figure 2
illustrates the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Composite Home Price Index
for the period 2000 to 2010. It describes the Housing Bubble so we need
to explain what the concept “bubble” means. Economists have not yet
reached an agreement on a unique, unambiguously clear and precise
definition. Following Barlevy (2007, 2015), Akerlof, and Shiller (2010)
we describe the housing bubble as the evolution of housing prices
during four stages. First, housing prices increase at some average trend
rate when demand appears stronger than supply with prices going up.
Notice that we do not specify exactly the rate of growth of these prices,
nor do we quantify the length of the period of these increases. Ex post,
one can observe, as in figure 2, that the trend from 2000 to 2004 was
lower than the one that followed from 2004 to 2006.
The second stage involves the escalation of prices by speculative
demand. In other words, the steady increases of the first stage generate
a positive feedback to prices. Speculators who observe increases in past
prices anticipate further increases in the future and buy now to sell later
at an expected higher price.
Barlevy (2015) describes this process of speculators buying not
because they believe the fundamental price is low and will therefore
increase but because they hope to sell to another fool at a higher future
price. Akerlof and Shiller (2010) emphasize the psychological euphoria
of traders with an emphasis on behavioral exuberance. Since speculation
and exuberance have now pushed prices above fundamentals, the
probability of expecting further increases begins to decline which means
the probability of a correction increases, both describing the third stage
of a bubble. These conditions indicate the bubble is close to its peak. In
figure 2, this stage was reached in early 2006 with a peak in late
summer. The final stage is when some triggering factor reverses the

The Evolving Nature of Asset Price Bubbles

39

FIGURE 2.— The U.S. Housing Bubble 2000-2010
positive feedback mechanism that drove prices excessively high.
Panicked speculators realize peak prices are fragile and begin to sell and
this large selling volume overwhelms demand and prices collapse. This
took place for the Housing Bubble between the end of 2006 and
mid-2009 with a total correction of about 30%.
With this description of figure 2, we can offer an informal definition
for a bubble as asset price increases driven by speculation and
exuberance beyond what is justified by fundamentals that cannot be
sustained beyond some high level at which time the asset’s price is
vulnerable to a collapse that eventually takes place. It is worth noting
that both the illustration of the Housing Bubble and the definition
require the crashing stage, otherwise the concept of the bubble cannot
hold. If in figure 2, prices continued to move randomly past their highest
level without crashing or if they declined over a long time in a
disciplined fashion, one could not use the concept of a bubble to
describe the housing market during this period. This means that asset
price bubbles are identified with certainty only ex-post since their
crashing is a necessary condition.
We emphasize that there is no consensus among financial
economists about the size of the bubble’s rise, the length of time
required for this increase to materialize, and finally about the magnitude
of the price collapse. While the search for a clear and mathematically
unambiguous definition continues, both the history of bubbles and our
recent experiences with them implicate a pricing that combines
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fundamental (rational) reasoning with levels of irrational exuberance
that generate positive feedback up to some high level of prices when the
bubble crashes.
Similar to the narrative presented in figure 2, asset price bubbles
begin when favorable fundamental conditions prevail with a growing
economy driven by successful monetary and fiscal policies that generate
above average asset returns. Uncertainty about future prices of an asset
whose returns are currently unknowable in the Knightian sense of no
available data, may drive a positive feedback mechanism. This develops
when recent past prices weigh in more heavily than rationally expected
future prices. If in addition, the asset’s supply conditions are inelastic
or short selling is difficult –new homes take time to build and cannot be
sold short -- while leveraged credit conditions fuel demand increases,
prices eventually reach unsustainable levels when some triggering event
causes the bursting of the bubble.

III. Financial Instability
Thus far, we have described the specific Housing Bubble of 2000-2010
that motivated a tentative definition and a narrative for asset price
bubbles in general. One may ask what causes bubbles to emerge. More
specifically, what caused the Housing Bubble and how did it destabilize
the financial markets? There are two broad hypotheses about the causes
of the Housing Bubble, proposed by Taylor and Bernanke.
Taylor (2007) argues that the easy monetary policy followed by the
Fed during the 2000-2004 period contributed to a dramatic increase in
the demand for housing. In turn, this increased demand for housing
caused prices to increase significantly during 2002-2006. Similar
policies in several other countries such as the U.K., Ireland, and Spain,
fueled a global real estate boom. Taylor (2007) grounds his hypothesis
on the Taylor rule that mechanically computes the appropriate fed funds
rate using as inputs the deviations from maximum employment and
deviations from a long-term desired rate of inflation of about 2%. He
computes the appropriate rates of fed funds using his rule and concludes
that the actual rates targeted by the Fed during the 2002-2004 period
were lower and fueled the Housing Bubble.
Bernanke (2010, 2013) critically evaluates the Taylor hypothesis and
argues that the low interest rates observed in financial markets were not
decided unwisely by the Fed but rather were the result of a substantial

The Evolving Nature of Asset Price Bubbles

41

global saving glut during the period of the housing bubble formation.
These large savings were mostly originated in emerging markets,
primarily China, with international financial institutions accumulating
funds from saving countries and lending in the U.S. There is a long
literature evaluating these two basic hypotheses. Hayford and Malliaris
(2011), Bhar, Malliaris and Malliaris (2015) and Bhar and Malliaris
(2016) offer a detailed overview of these issues and Bernanke (2010,
2013 and 2015) gives an exhaustive examination of the Housing
Bubble, its causes, its consequences and the response of monetary
policy.
In particular, Bernanke (2010) gives detailed evidence that Federal
Reserve fed funds policies are not responsible for the housing bubble;
the central argument is the global character of the housing bubble. Since
housing prices increased across many different countries, following
dissimilar monetary policies, Taylor’s argument fails to explain the
actual determinants of the U.S. housing bubble. In addition, Bernanke
argues that the housing market is driven by long-term interest rates that
the Fed does not directly target. In particular, fed funds and long-term
interest rates have complex nonlinear dynamic relationships and one
cannot argue that low fed funds imply low mortgage rates. Bernanke
(2015) revisits these issues arguing that Taylor’s mechanistic approach
cannot replace the extensive deliberations of the Federal Open Market
Committee that has addressed the causes and consequences of the
Housing Bubble in detail.
The two hypotheses proposed by Taylor –low fed funds rates—and
Bernanke –the global saving glut with low longer-term interest
rates—do not exhaust the causes of the Housing Bubble. Homebuyers
usually finance the purchase of their home with a 20% cash down
payment and a mortgage given to credit worthy households. During the
Housing Bubble, down payments were reduced, the role of credit
worthiness of borrowers was radically diminished and the volume of
subprime mortgages was significantly increased. Financial markets
seriously underestimated the risks associated with housing lending
because they expected housing prices to continue rising. Furthermore,
data about housing prices during the past 30 years prior to early 2006
clearly documented no price declines exceeding a 10% loss.
During 2003 and 2004, while the Housing Bubble was growing,
Lehman Brothers acquired five mortgage lenders. One of them was
BNC Mortgage that specialized in subprime mortgages, and another was
Aurora Loan Services that specialized in making loans to borrowers
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without full documentation. Lehman prospered during the boom until
its bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.
Innovations in mortgage financing created private-label
mortgage-backed securities providing most of the funding of subprime
mortgages. From the pools of mortgage-backed securities, additional
derivatives products were created by repackaging various levels of risk
as well as derivative products hedging such risks, such as the credit
default swaps. A buyer of such a product pays a monthly premium that
ensures the expected income from the package of mortgages bought in
case such payments cease to be paid. The global saving glut, articulated
by Bernanke, fueled demand for such products that in turn contributed
to increasing demand for housing. Lehman, Bear Stearns and other
investment banks chose to invest themselves in these mortgage-backed
securities, financing such holding with short-term credit.
Eventually in late 2006, house prices peaked; mortgage refinancing
ended and selling existing homes became difficult. A large percentage
of homeowners realized that the value of their mortgages was higher
than the market value of their home and defaulted. Large pools of
mortgage-backed securities were downgraded to reflect the realized risk
of declining prices and several subprime lenders were bankrupted. The
positive feedback of the Housing Bubble that prevailed up until
mid-2006 was tested during 2007 but no one could anticipate the
dramatic developments that followed. In December of 2007, the U.S.
economy entered into a recession with fed funds around 5% and
estimates about the total cost of the subprime crisis projected to be
around $300 billion. The financial system however remained stable until
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, on September 15, 2008.
Lehman Brothers was a large investment bank that had prospered
during the Housing Bubble by issuing subprime mortgages and
securitizing mortgage-backed securities. While the housing bubble was
growing during the 2004-2007 period its profits increased dramatically
and its stock had reached a record high price of about $85 in February
of 2007 from around $30 in 2003. Lehman’s leverage ratio of total
assets to shareholders’ equity was around 30 in mid-2007 but as the
Housing Bubble continued to deflate in 2007 and 2008, Lehman’s assets
decreased in value and its stock price collapsed even faster. During
summer 2008, Lehman management sought various solutions such as
the sale of assets, raising more capital or finding a buyer among the
largest banks. These strategies did not work and on September 15, 2008,
Lehman Brothers with 25,000 employees worldwide filed for
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bankruptcy with $639 billion in assets and $619 billion in debt. This
event triggered financial instability with global equity markets
experiencing a decline of $10 trillion in market capitalization.
What is financial instability? Economic and financial instabilities are
complex phenomena. Broadly speaking, economists theorize that
economies, with their subsets of the real and financial sectors, are
inherently, and most of the time in a state of equilibrium. When a big
market shock takes place--such as a stock market crash, bank runs,
sovereign insolvency, currency devaluations and other similar
events--the financial sector and the economy experience a major shock
that causes a deviation from this equilibrium. These deviations are
described as instabilities to capture disequilibrium states of the economy
that persist without a systemic tendency to return to the prior
equilibrium. These short-term deviations can be costly from a societal
perspective as markets fail to perform their basic function of allocating
resources efficiently.
Rosengren (2011) emphasizes that the central function of financial
markets is to allocate capital efficiently. This requires financial stability.
Rosengren argues that “financial stability reflects the ability of the
financial system to consistently supply the credit intermediation and
payment services that are needed in the real economy if it is to continue
on its growth path.” When the financial system suffers a major financial
disturbance that interrupts or seriously freezes the process of allocating
capital, two types of interrelated risks emerge. First, the system
experiences valuation risk because the financial instability has increased
uncertainty and traders have difficulty correctly measuring fundamental
values of assets. Second, there is a macroeconomic risk. This means that
traders also need to assess the likelihood of a recession because of
financial disruptions in investment and consumer spending. Thus,
financial instability creates uncertainty, asset price volatility, and
misallocation of capital--all of which negatively affect the real
economy. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was the event that triggered
financial instability.

IV. Monetary Policy
When asset bubbles burst, financial markets freeze or stop performing
their vitally important function of allocating capital and supporting
economic activities. The responsible institution for restoring financial
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stability is the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Act of
1913 established the U. S. central banking system, called the Federal
Reserve System, and charged it to design a national currency and
conduct a monetary policy to promote financial stability. In 1977,
Congress amended The Federal Reserve Act, stating explicitly:
"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain a long run growth
of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the
economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable
prices and moderate long-term interest rates."
Among the three goals of maximum employment, stable prices and
moderate long-term interest rates, the first two have received
precedence and thus most consideration over the years. The pursuit of
maximum employment and price stability as the Fed’s primary goals has
evolved into the Fed’s current “dual mandate.” The Fed cannot force
prices in a market economy to remain stable or achieve maximum
employment and output directly. During the past forty years, the Fed has
endeavored to achieve its dual mandate indirectly by increasing or
decreasing a short-term interest rate, called the federal funds rate,
through open market operations. Figure 3 illustrates the monthly fed
funds rate since 1955 and demonstrates that the Fed has been very
actively pursuing its goals. What is eye-catching in this graph is that,
since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09, the fed funds rate has
dropped to close to zero and stayed there until late 2015. Even today in
mid-2018, almost 10 years since the bursting of the housing bubble, the
financial collapse and the Great Recession, fed funds remain around
1.75%.
Figure 3 shows that that federal funds rate that stood at 5.25% in
August 2007, by December 2008 were reduced to a range of 0 to 25
basis points. This rapid decline in the fed funds rate, in a little over a
year, was the result of several factors that included, among others, the
intensity of the bursting of the housing bubble, the impact of the
financial instability and the scope of the Great Recession.
In late 2008, the Fed decided to use an unconventional method to
stimulate the U.S. economy, which was constrained by the zero lower
bound of fed funds. The tool used by the Fed was the, so-called,
Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) or Quantitative Easing (QE). QE
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FIGURE 3.— Federal Funds Rates, 1955-2018
consisted of the Federal Reserve purchasing longer-term U.S. Treasury
securities and agency mortgage-backed securities, with the aim of
driving down longer-term interest rates, thereby stimulating economic
activity. Bernanke (2013, 2015) discusses the progression of QE in
detail. It was not known at the beginning how many rounds of QE were
necessary for the restoration of stability in the financial sector and
economic recovery in the real sector. Today, with the benefit of
historical experience we know that the Fed executed three main rounds
of QE. These three rounds of QE are also called “unconventional”
monetary policy because they targeted long-term interest rates, in
contrast to “conventional” monetary policy that employs short-term fed
funds. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced QE1
on November 25, 2008. The plans were for the Fed to purchase $600
billion on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and agency debt. The
strategy was officially implemented on December 15, 2008. It was
extended on March 18, 2009 when the FOMC announced the purchase
of an additional $750 billion of MBS and $300 billion of Treasuries.
The plan was concluded in December 2009, about a year later.
After the termination of QE1 at the end of 2009, the labor and
housing markets continued to be weak as the economy faced a slower
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recovery. Although spending for household consumption and business
investments had seen progress, there were substantial weaknesses in
both the labor and housing markets that persuaded the Fed to announce
QE2. The objective was to strengthen the economic recovery and to
fight deflation, by lowering longer-term interest rates. By lowering
interest rates, the goal was to increase consumer spending and business
investments, in attempts to alleviate unfavorable conditions in the
financial markets and pursue the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum
employment with stable prices. On June 22, 2011, the Federal Reserve
released a statement stating, “To promote the ongoing economic
recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels
consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to keep the
target range for the Federal Funds rate at 0 percent to 0.25%.” The Fed
also announced it would purchase up to 600 billion dollars of long-term
treasury securities. The FOMC also decided to continue to maintain its
previous policy of reinvesting funds from its QE holdings.
The FOMC announced QE3 on September 2012. It did not specify
the total amount but indicated monthly purchases of $40 billion in MBS.
This amount increased by another $45 billion of purchases of Treasuries
on December 12, 2012. The monthly amount of large-scale asset
purchases of $85 billion consisting of both MBS and Treasuries
continued for all of 2013 and tapered gradually over 10 months prior to
its termination on October 29, 2014.
During the seven-year QE period, numerous financial and economic
developments took place that shaped these strategies. Numerous FOMC
minutes, testimonies and speeches by Fed officials provide rich and
useful information. Bernanke (2015) offers a detailed evaluation of QE.
The primary lesson learned from this long period of seven years of
unconventional monetary policy is how challenging it was to restore
financial stability. The first increase in the fed funds rate took place in
December 2015 to .50 %, the second increase in December 2016 to
.75% and as the economy stabilized further and unemployment dropped
below 4.5%, three additional fed funds increases occurred in 2017.
Currently, in July 2018, fed funds are at 1.75%.
Because of these QE strategies, the balance sheet of the Fed has
expanded from about $1 trillion of assets prior to the crisis to over $4.5
trillion in early 2018. The critical question is this: what have these three
massive QE accomplished? There is a general and a particular response.
The general response claims that when the Fed reached its zero lower
bound, it became obvious that the stabilization of the U.S. economy
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required additional monetary stimulus, because economic growth was
very slow and there was no risk of inflation. The gradual return to
moderate economic growth of the U.S. real economy since the end of
the Great Recession in June of 2009 is partial evidence of the overall
effectiveness of the three QEs.
The particulars of these strategies address the channels of monetary
transmission: if QE reduces longer-term interest rates, then consumers
may pay less for their debt obligations and thus have more income for
consumption; simultaneously, longer-term interests also reduce the debt
obligations of corporations and private firms, thus increasing their
profits and contributing to higher asset valuations. In turn, these higher
asset valuations encourage corporate business investments and increases
in employment. In addition, as QE reduces interest rates, equity prices
rise and consumers may increase their spending because of increases in
the value of their assets, called the wealth effect. However, we also need
to emphasize that lower longer-term interest rates also reduce the
income of bond investors such as insurance companies and individual
bond investors.
There are numerous studies evaluating the effectiveness of QE.
Williams (2011) reviews several of these studies and reports that the
estimated effects of QE on Treasury yields in these studies are very
consistent, particularly when one considers the broad variety of sample
periods and different econometric methods. Specifically, estimates of
the impact of QE on longer-term Treasury yields that Williams reports
range between 0.15% and 0.20%. These estimates may seem small but
if one uses the benchmark that it takes on average a 0.75% cut in the fed
funds rate to reduce Treasury yields by 0.15% to 0.20%, the impact of
QE is significant. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that QE had an
impact in reducing long-term Treasury yields. It is more challenging,
however to show empirically how these declines in Treasury yields have
helped the Fed achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment with
stable prices. Bernanke (2012) suggests that QE works through the
portfolio channel, and Williams (2011) explains that the confirmation
of this hypothesis is a more challenging empirical issue that remains to
be conclusively established.
In addition to QE, the Fed has also used additional tools in its pursuit
to restore maximum employment. Among these additional tools
employed, we mention the continuous communications guidance
supplied by the Fed. The Fed also initiated paying interest on excess
reserves held by the banks on deposit at the central bank and it
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employed the reverse repurchase agreement and the term deposit
facility, both introduced during the recent financial crisis. Bernanke
(2015) describes these tools in his memoir. He also discusses valuable
initiatives in fiscal policy – the Troubled Asset Relief Program of 2008;
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009-- and financial
regulation -- the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010.
When calculating the heavy economic costs of the Great Recession
and the enormous efforts by the Fed over a period of eight years to
restore financial stability, is it reasonable to ask what if monetary
policy, instead of responding to the bursting of the housing bubble had
anticipated it and leaned against it? This question is known in the
monetary policy literature as the “lean vs. clean” controversy. Leaning
against a bubble means that monetary policy, at some point during the
period of the bubble’s rise, chooses to increase the fed funds rate to
discourage its further growth. However, bubbles cannot be identified
easily during the build-up period and so it is very risky for a central
bank to decide when and for how long to act. In addition, the impact of
higher interest rates on a bubble is not quantifiable and the effectiveness
of this tool is debatable.
Beyond such technical issues, central banks do not have a clear
charge to deflate asset bubbles and if they chose to do so, by increasing
fed funds, this may undermine their official dual mandate. In general,
all of this leads a central bank to pursue the “clean” choice. When there
is evidence, the bubble has crashed and the financial system is under
stress, decreases in fed funds prevent financial panics. Thus, the “lean
vs. clean” controversy is a choice by the central bank to respond
asymmetrically. That is, ignore the bubble during its built-up but
respond rapidly to the bubble’s bursting. In an influential paper,
Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016) carefully review 23 identified
bubble episodes and find that the severity of a bubble bursting is less
linked to the type of asset than to the financing of the bubble. They also
document that experience suggests that purely passive “cleaning” after
the bubble burst is very costly, although correct methods and tools for
“leaning” against a bubble remain loaded with complexities.
The “lean vs. clean” controversy continues to evolve and the
question remains relevant: should asset price bubbles be considered as
benign financial episodes outside the practical influence of central
banks? A large literature, reviewed in Malliaris (2012, 2016) and
Evanoff and Malliaris (2018), has grown that investigates the polar
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answers “yes” and “no” and the in-between “it depends” to this concise
question and its numerous reformulations. Our narratives that follow
revisit this question.

V. The Stock Market Bubble and Crash of 1929
The stock market bubble of the 1920s and its crash in October 1929
remains the most devastating bubble in U.S. economic history. Its seeds
were sown the early years in the decade with solid economic and
technological fundamentals. Then, a positive feedback of increasing
prices fueled speculation that eventually led to a crash and a financial
panic that produced the Great Depression of the 1930s. Examining
Graph 4, we can distinguish the four stages of the bubble. First, prices
kept increasing from 1920 to 1927 based on a booming economy.
During this period, people were leaving the farms and moving to big
cities. There were great construction, booming retailing, banking and
insurance services were growing, and new technologies such as
telephones, automobiles, aeronautical, radio, movies, and chemicals
created both new jobs and great optimism for future prosperity. Older
industries such as railroads and oil were also doing very well.
A sample of great industrial companies that were included in the
Dow Jones Industrial Index included American Can, American
Tobacco, Bethlehem Steel, U.S. Steel, General Electric, Westinghouse,
General Motors, Chrysler, General Railway, National Cash Register,
Radio Corporation of America, Standard Oil, Wright Aeronautical, F.
W. Woolworth, Sears and Union Carbide, among several others. The
soaring economy and the financial success of these companies
established a positive feedback mechanism. Investors bought stocks
expecting good returns and paid higher prices than earlier investors, but
with new investors entering the market, attracted by positive returns,
prices continued to rise. Then we see in the graph that around early
1927 until the stock market reached its peak in September 2019,
speculation intensified. Financial history suggests that innovations, such
as the establishment of brokerage houses, investment trusts and margin
accounts fueled this speculation further. The stable performance of
increasing stock prices over the period from mid-1921 to late 1928,
distorted the risks associated with equity and both investors borrowing
to buy stocks and lenders offering these loans, drove the bubble to its
peak during the first nine months of 1929. Thus, the Dow Jones Index
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that stood at 63 points in August 1921 had climbed to 381 points in
September 1929, a 600% increase.
On October 28, 1929, the bubble crashed with an initial 13% drop
that was followed by additional big drops, some rebounds and further
drops to end at around 40 points, in summer of 1932; this was a crash
that shrunk the bubble by about 90%. What caused it? What destabilized
the financial system and how was the economy affected? Lastly, what
helped the economy recover?
We offer brief answers from a selective list of references. Galbraith
(1954) presents a rich context of the speculation that brought the stock
market to unsustainable highs by early 1929. Participants did not know
what to expect next: further increases? A big correction? Stable prices?
Newspapers at the time reported a divergence of opinions. Some experts
argued prices were justified by fundamentals and expected them to stay
at high levels; others believed prices were driven to very high and
unsustainable highs. Galbraith goes day by day and identifies
well-known financial leaders who offered their assessments of the
market. The bullish sentiment slowly declined. Its advocates appeared
less persuasive in generating support for the ever-increasing number of
bearish sellers. Prices became more volatile. During early October 1929,
speculators holding large positions started to lose confidence in the
market and the imbalance between buyers and sellers crashed the market
by the end of October.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) enrich the descriptive presentation
of Galbraith with a scholarly analysis of the role of monetary policy.
They argue that the Federal Reserve, just established a few years earlier
on December 1913, watched nervously the stock market bubble
growing. The Fed knew that speculators purchased stocks with
borrowed funds and the stock served as collateral, feeding further
borrowing. The Fed also understood that stock market speculation
differed from financing that went to productive investments in
agriculture or industry. Thus, in today’s language, the Fed aspired to
reduce stock market speculation and “lean” against the bubble.
However, there was no unanimous agreement about the appropriate
management of the stock market speculation. In addition, the U.S. was
under the gold standard that imposed constraints both to the U.S.
Treasury in terms of the size of the federal deficit and the Fed in terms
of interest rate policies.
One approach for the Fed was to focus on the stock market
speculation and its funding. Another way was to increase the discount
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rate, across all lending. In February 1929, the Federal Reserve Board
asked Reserve Banks to deny requests for credit from member banks
that loaned funds to speculators. However, the New York Fed favored
raising the discount lending rate that by August 1929 was granted by the
Federal Reserve Board. Increases in the discount lending rate in the U.S.
were followed by increases in other countries, motivated by the gold
standard that prevailed at the time. Central banks in other countries
reasoned that if they did not follow the U.S. in increasing their interest
rates, they would lose part of their gold reserves. This unfortunate
global increase in interest rates during the summer of 1929 coincided
with the beginning of an economic recession. The National Bureau of
Economic Research reports that the U.S. economy experienced a
recession during August 1929 to March 1933, that later was named the
Great Depression.
The weakness in the real economy during the late summer of 1929
along with the increase in the discount lending rate contributed to a
reassessment by speculators about the sustainability of the stock market
boom. When optimists could not sustain the record-high levels of the
Dow-Jones Index and prices started dropping in late October 1929,
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that the Fed was reluctant to act
as a lender of last resort and supply the necessary funds to commercial
banks. Initially, the New York Fed provided liquidity to commercial
banks in New York City but its authority to do so was challenged by the
Federal Reserve Board. Figure 4 illustrates the stock market continued
its decline from late 1929 to early 1933. Commercial banks that had
made loans to speculators saw their collateral value decline and without
the clear determination of the Board to supply the necessary liquidity,
their obligations to depositors could not be met. During this period
nearly 10,000 bank failures occurred, credit essentially froze and
unemployment from 3.2% in 1929 increased to about 25% by 1933.
GDP declined by 8.5% in 1930, by 6.4% in 1931, by 12.9% in 1932 and
by 1.3% in 1933. In addition, during the depression, wages declined by
42%, the money supply by 30% and deflation was about 310 % per
year. Romer (1990), Calomiris (1993) and Bernanke (2004) offer a
detailed analysis of the impact of financial developments on the real
economy.
Our understanding today about the stock market bubble of the 1920s
and its crash on October 28, 1929 is that the financial instability it
produced that ravaged the real economy is, essentially, the result of
wrong monetary policies. As the stock market bubble was collapsing,
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FIGURE 4.— The Stock Market Crash of 1929
the Fed was increasing interest rates. As speculators were moving from
the stock market to currency markets, the Fed responded to preserve the
value of the dollar fixed at $20.67 per ounce of gold instead, of giving
priority to employment and GDP growth. Increasing interest rates and
collapsing stock prices caused banks to fail, thus bank credit also
collapsed. Panicked depositors withdrew deposits from banks and
further contributed to bank failures. Increasing unemployment decreased
demand and bred deflation. In an environment of declining prices of
about 10% per year, past accumulated debts became an unsustainable
burden for firms and households. The Fed did not respond to provide
the necessary liquidity and bank failures continued to increase and the
money supply continued its contraction.
This narrative gives perspective to the archetypical concept of
financial instability. During the Great Depression, money supply
declined, the stock market continued to collapse, a large number of
banks failed, households lost their saving, the demand for goods and
services plummeted dramatically because of deflation and
unemployment and, finally, the demand for capital and supply of saving
withered as financial risks skyrocketed. Therefore, the financial system
had stopped performing its vital function of allocating capital, thus
bringing blockages to the real economy.
How did the U.S. get out of the Great Depression? Franklin D.
Roosevelt was elected President in 1932 and he believed that to end the
depression the government needed to undertake a very aggressive
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economic involvement. He called it the New Deal to create new jobs
and stimulate economic growth. An extensive bibliography discusses
numerous initiatives such as the creation of Social Security, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Civil Works Administration, abandoning the gold
standard, the creation of the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and many
more initiatives that involved the three areas of fiscal policy, monetary
policy and regulation. Romer (1990, 1992) discusses in detail these
remarkable initiatives.

VI. The Stock Market Crash of 1987
Figure 5 illustrates the one-day crash of the stock market that occurred
on October 19, 1987. Unlike the other two crashes we have described,
this one was the first crash since the Great Depression and one that
influenced most global stock exchanges. Malliaris and Urrutia (1991,
1992) present detailed statistical evidence on the international linkages
of this crash.
What is unique about this crash is that it is not the result of a big
bubble bursting. Stock prices were increasing for several years before
the crash but not in a bubbly way. In addition, as illustrated in figure 5,
after the one-day big decline of about 22%, stock prices recovered and
continued their upward trend. Therefore, the relevant questions for this
crash are two. First, what triggered this crash and second, how did
monetary policy respond?
Among economic fundamentals, it was reported in mid-October, that
the U.S. trade deficit was larger than expected. The dollar fell.
Volatility increased in global equity and currency markets. Treasury
Secretary James Baker made certain remarks about the option of
devaluing the dollar to narrow the nation’s increasing trade deficits.
These remarks undermined investor confidence. Beyond these important
negative fundamentals, several innovations had been introduced in
equity markets. These included the stock index futures contracts,
computerized arbitrage between cash markets and index futures
contracts and portfolio insurance. Portfolio insurance described a
financial innovation that allowed equity funds to buy an appropriate
amount of puts on an equity index to ensure (the exact concept here is
“to hedge”) the value of their holdings. These products were traded via
open outcry methods at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago
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FIGURE 5.— The Stock Market Crash of 1987
Board of Trade and the Chicago Board Options Exchange that differed
from the New York Stock Exchange that followed the specialist
arrangements. Furthermore, traders in these markets were unable to
exhibit a comprehensive financial condition so a winning one could not
offset a losing position because they took place in different markets.
The liquidation of losing positions intensified further price declines.
On October 19, U.S. markets opened with heavy selling following
the plunging in European markets that had in turn followed the Asian
markets. As prices were plummeting at the New York Stock Exchange,
traders at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange took action by shorting the
S&P 500 Index Futures contract. Arbitrage was triggered as the basis
between the cash and futures widened. This added to volatility and
added to further cash selling in New York. When prices quickly reached
declines of 10%, some portfolio programs triggered the purchasing of
puts and those traders who chose to sell these puts hedged their
positions by selling the underlying stocks, adding further selling
pressure to the New York Stock Exchange. Eventually, all trading
stopped in New York, so there was no pricing information. However,
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange chose to remain open and markets
finally closed at the end of the day with large price discrepancies among
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the numerous products.
The Fed acted very decisively by providing huge liquidity. During
the evening of October 19, and before markets opened the following
morning, the Fed contacted all banks involved in financing specialist
firms. Most valued their inventory at about 20% less than when they
started trading that day. Such losses, for some, were more than their
capital. Banks instead of liquidating the remaining assets and causing
a financial panic, extended unlimited credit that supported equity prices
the following trading day. Markets calmed down and by late afternoon
on Tuesday, October 20, some speculators started buying stock index
futures in Chicago. Next, arbitrage triggered stock purchases in New
York and both cash and derivatives markets stabilized. No market
instability was experienced past the day of the crash and the real
economy was not affected. Appropriate financial regulations were
introduced by the exchanges to better manage the new financial
instruments including clearing and settlement procedures and circuit
breakers. Garcia (1989) discusses the role of the Fed in containing the
1987 crash.

VII. The Internet Bubble and Crash of 2000
The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ) system started in 1971. By late 1997, NASDAQ had 5,500
listed companies. Technology companies were 35% of total market
capitalization. Figure 6 illustrates the rapid increases in the NASDAQ
100 Index. This graph shows that the index was about 500 in 1995 and
five years later, had climbed to about 4,700.
What caused the NASDAQ 100 bubble? There is wide agreement
that it was driven by new technology. By the early 1990s, advances in
internet connectivity, commercial usage of the internet, software and
hardware advances for desk computers, all were growing rapidly.
Numerous new companies had just started, among them Dell, Compaq,
Gateway, Apple Computer, Silicon Graphics, America Online,
Netscape, Microsoft, 3Com, Amazon, Cisco, and Sun Microsystems.
There was financial exuberance everywhere and Fed Chairman
Greenspan (1996) addressed it when he reflected
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FIGURE 6.— The Internet Bubble, 1995-2005
“But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly
escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and
prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?
And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as
central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset
bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production,
jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of
1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we
should not underestimate or become complacent about the
complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy.
Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset
prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of
monetary policy.”
The Fed’s dual mandate made it focus on the real economy.
Although Greenspan had raised the possibility of a bubble and
economists were discussing the “lean vs. clean” choices, fed funds
moved slowly. Actually, figure 3, discussed earlier, contains the
behavior of fed funds during this period of the 1990s. Notice that fed
funds were around 3% in December 1993, increased to about 6% in
May 1995, and after a small decline rose again to 6.5% by August 2000.
One way to describe Fed policy during this period is to say the Fed was
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attempting a soft landing for the economy, also hoping for a moderation
of the Internet Bubble. Hayford and Malliaris (2001, 2004, 2005)
address how the Fed responded to the Internet Bubble and Kohn (2006)
offers an overview of the role of monetary policy towards asset bubbles.
The NASDAQ 100 reached its highest value of about 4700 in March
2000. From March to September 2000, the Index exhibited very high
volatility and then it started its decline reaching its lowest value of 810
in October 2002, a decline of over 80%. As the NASDAQ 100 begun its
final decline, fed funds stood at 6.5% in December 2000 and they
started to decrease. By August 2003, fed funds had dropped to 1%.
During this period, the U.S. economy also experienced a mild recession
that started in March 2001 and ended in November 2001.
Thus, the five-year-long investor exuberance about the unlimited
new business possibilities of internet deflated without financial
instabilities and devastating economic costs. As the Fed attempted to
soft-land the economy, without leaning against this bubble, it allowed
markets to reassess risks, go through major price gyrations, and
materialize significant wealth loses, experience a mild recession with
unemployment growing from 4% to 6.5% and returning to normal few
quarters later. While the fed funds increased slowly during the growth
of the bubble, when the bubble deflated and the economy entered into
a recession, the fed funds decline was rapid and significant. Jalilvand
and Malliaris (2010) connect the internet bubble to the housing bubble
that followed.

VIII. Lessons Learned
This paper focuses on the links that arise between asset price bubbles
and financial instabilities and how both of them often cause economic
recessions. The two famous asset bubbles discussed here are the Stock
Market Bubble of the 1920s and its Crash of 1929 and the Housing
Bubble of 2000-2007 that caused the Great Recession. The bursting of
these two big bubbles produced severe financial instabilities and major
economic downturns. Our analysis leads to four major conclusions.
First, despite the impressive evolution of economies in advanced
industrialized countries, and to a lesser degree in developing countries,
during the past century, these economies remain subject to booms and
busts. The development of the recent housing bubble, its crash and the
great recession that followed were essentially unexpected because the

58

Multinational Finance Journal

business cycle methodology focuses on ordinary and minor deviations
from long-run economic trends. Moving forward, policymakers need to
expand their narrow focus on business cycles to include the assessment
of risks of major financial crises. This paper highlights how asset
bubbles often produce financial instabilities. Going beyond our focus on
bubbles, other causes also exist that produce financial crises. These
include banking crises, currency crises, sovereign debt crises as well as
noneconomic shocks such as natural disasters, political instabilities or
wars.
Second, the formation of asset price bubbles in global financial
markets, mostly driven by sophisticated and rational traders, remains a
challenge. The pre-Keynesian literature summarized in Kindleberger
(1978) uses the concepts of “boom and bust” to describe rapid economic
growth with rising asset prices and their eventual collapse. Keynes
introduced the concept of “animal spirits”. Greenspan in our earlier
quote uses the notion of “exuberance”. These concepts clearly describe
human feelings. Our discussion included illustrations of such
phenomena. Economists need input from psychologists to develop a
methodology to analyze financial bubbles. Malliaris, Shaw and Shiffrin
(2016) propose such an inter-disciplinary approach.
Third, since it takes much longer for the build-up and growth of a
bubble compared to its collapse and rapid decline, this asymmetry is
challenging for monetary policy. For the bubbles discussed in this
paper, monetary policy responded to the crash rather than the build-up
of the bubble. During 1929, the Fed increased interest rates few months
before the crash to reduce speculation but this was unsuccessful. The
last two bubbles, the internet and housing, have revived the “lean vs.
clean” debate and new theoretical and empirical work is now created to
resolve the appropriateness of these two choices.
Fourth, a desirable property of an economic and financial system is
its stability. A system is stable if it recovers quickly from a shock that
disturbs its equilibrium. The fundamental assumption of the modern
capitalist system with free markets and a government sector is that it is
stable. Recently, during the period from the mid-1980s to 2007, called
the Great Moderation, the U.S. economy was very stable. Yet, this
stability ended with the crashing of the housing bubble. This appears
paradoxical. Yellen (2009, 2014) discusses how often stability creates
its own instability by bringing attention to the works of H. Minsky
(1986). The seeds of a major asset bubble are sown during a period of
strong fundamentals. We emphasized this idea several times in this
paper. Beyond fundamentals, however, speculation is also important and
easy financing often drives excessive speculation. When the bubble’s
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positive feedback suddenly reverses and the value of collateral declines,
this produces financial instability. In other words, the shock to the
financial system is caused by the sudden devaluation of collateral
repriced at the crashed price in comparison to the debt owed for buying
the same asset at an elevated pre-crash price. Balance sheets of financial
institutions are seriously impacted by crashes that reprice assets and
liabilities and thus generate increasing uncertainty that often freezes the
allocation of capital and brings economic recessions. Monetary policy
with its tool of short-term interest rates is currently unskilled to promote
ex-ante conditions for enduring financial stability. Buiter (2014) and
Yellen (2017) discuss the role of central banks in financial stability and
the task of macroprudential regulation as an engaging tool.
In conclusion, this paper illustrates that because bubbles and
instabilities cannot be removed from modern economies, monetary
policy has evolved, since the Great Depression, to tackle the economic
costs of bubble crashes in terms of unemployment and lost output. This
paper chronicles a series of initiatives taken by the Fed to restore
financial stability during the past decade. These unconventional
monetary policies were accompanied by fiscal and regulatory initiatives
that all together have worked well so by 2018 the U.S. economy is back
to its normal equilibrium.
Endnotes
This paper presents ideas I discussed, at the University of Macedonia,
during my awarding of an Honorary Doctorate by the Department of
Accounting and Finance, School of Business Administration, on
December 19, 2017. I am most grateful for this distinguished academic
recognition to Professor Christos Negkakis who first conceived the idea
a few years ago and nurtured it big-heartedly to a splendid celebration.
I am also thankful to Professors Achileas Zapranis, Panagiotis
Taxinakis, and Athanasios Noulas for their support and participation
during the ceremony and the entire faculty of the Department of
Accounting and Finance that made this award possible with their
gracious approval. I am also appreciative of the presence of Professor
Panayiotis Theodossiou who traveled from Cyprus to participate and to
the large audience of faculty, administrators, staff and students who
attended the ceremony and offered their generous compliments. This
paper draws on several of my published articles that address various
aspects of asset price bubbles referenced in the text and listed in the
bibliography. I am pleased to thank all of my co-authors for our valuable
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collaboration: they include R. Bhar, Doug Evanoff, Marc Hayford, Abol
Jalilvand, George Kaufman, Mary Malliaris, Hersh Shefrin, Leslie Shaw
and Jorge Urrutia. This paper differs partially from my earlier work
because it reflects my current focus on the relationship between asset
bubble crashes and financial instability. The fresh idea that emerges
from a review of both the Great Depression and the Great Recession is
that the restoration of financial stability is very costly to the real
economy and challenging to monetary policy and it is thus best to
safeguard financial stability rather than to repair it.
Accepted by: Prof. P. Theodossiou, PhD, Editor-in-Chief , July 2018

References
Akerlof, G., and Shiller, R. 2010. Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology
Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Barlevy, G. 2007. Economic Theory and Asset Prices, Economic Perspectives.
Third Quarter: 44-59.
Barlevy, G. 2015 Bubbles and Fools Economic Perspectives. Second Quarter:
54-76.
Bhar, R.; Malliaris A. G; and Malliaris, M. E. 2015. The Impact of Large-scale
Asset Purchases on the S&P 500 index, Long-term Interest Rates and
Unemployment. Applied Economics 47(55): 6010-6018.
Bhar, R., and Malliaris, A. G. 2016. Asset Price Momentum and Monetary
Policy: Time-varying Parameter Estimation of Taylor Rules. Applied
Economics 48: 5329-5339.
Bernanke, B. 2004. Money, Gold, and the Great Depression, Remarks at the H.
Parker Willis Lecture in Economic Policy, Washington and Lee University,
Lexington, Virginia, March 2.
Bernanke, B. 2010. Monetary Policy and the Housing Market at the Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia, January
3.
Bernanke, B. 2012. Monetary Policy Since the Onset of the Crisis Remarks at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium, Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, August 31.
Bernanke, B. 2013. The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Bernanke, B. 2015. The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and its
Aftermath, New York W. W. Norton & Company.
Brunnermeier, M., and Schnabel, I. 2016. Bubbles and Central Banks:
Historical Perspectives Central Banks at a Crossroads: What Can We Learn

The Evolving Nature of Asset Price Bubbles

61

from History? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Buiter, W. 2014. The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How Has It
Changed? in Evanoff, D., Holthousen, C., Kaufman, G. and Kremer, M.
(editors). The Role of Central Banks, Singapore World Scientific.
Calomiris, C. 1993. Financial Factors in the Great Depression Journal of
Economic Perspectives 7: 61-85.
Evanoff, D.; Kaufman, G.; and Malliaris, A. G. 2012. (editors) New
Perspectives on Asset Price Bubbles: Theory, Evidence and Policy. New
York Oxford University Press.
Evanoff, D., and Malliaris, A.G. 2018. Asset Price Bubbles and Public Policy”
in Evanoff, D. Kaufman, G. and Malliaris, A.G. (editors) Public Policy and
Financial Economics: in Honor of Professor George Kaufman for His
Lifelong Contributions. Singapore World Scientific 197-246.
Friedman, M., and Schwartz, A. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Galbraith, J. K.1954. The Great Crash of 1929. New York Houghton Mifflin.
Garcia, G. 1989. The Lender of Last Resort in the Wake of the Crash. American
Economic Review 79: 151-55.
Greenspan, A. 1996. The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society
at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. December
5.
Hayford, M. D., and Malliaris, A. G. 2001. Is the Federal Reserve Stock Market
Bubble-Neutral? in Kaufman. G. (editor). Asset Price Bubbles: Implications
for Monetary and Regulatory Policies. Kidlington, Oxford, UK Elsevier
Science Ltd. 229-243.
Hayford, M., and Malliaris, A.G. 2004. Monetary Policy and the U.S. Stock
Market. Economic Inquiry 42: 387-401.
Hayford, M., and Malliaris, A.G. 2005. How Did the Fed React to the 1990s
Stock Market Bubble? Evidence from an Extended Taylor Rule. European
Journal of Operational Research 163: 20-29.
Hayford, M., and Malliaris, A.G. 2011. Causes of the Financial Crisis and the
Great Recession: The Role of U.S. Monetary Policy. The Journal of
Economic Asymmetries 8: 73-90.
Jalilvand, A., and Malliaris, A.G. 2010. Sequence of Asset Bubbles and the
Global Financial Crisis in Kolb, R. (editor). Lessons from the Financial
Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future, Hoboken, New
Jersey John Wiley & Sons, Inc.139-145.
Kindleberger, C. 1978. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial
Crises first edition Hoboken New Jersey Wiley.
Kindleberger, C. P., and Aliber, R. 2015. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A
History of Financial Crises seventh edition Hoboken New Jersey Wiley.
Kohn, D. L. 2006. Monetary Policy and Asset Prices Speech given at Monetary
Policy: A Journey from Theory to Practice A European Central Bank
Colloquium held in honor of Otmar Issing. Frankfurt, Germany.

62

Multinational Finance Journal

Kolb, R. 2011. The Financial Crisis of Our Time. New York Oxford University
Press.
Malliaris, A. G., and Urrutia, J. 1991. Linkages of National Stock Markets:
Statistical Evidence Before, During and After the October 1987 Crash.
Recent Developments in International Banking and Finance 4: 341-385.
Malliaris, A. G., and Urrutia, J. 1992. The International Crash of October 1987:
Causality Tests. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27:
353-364.
Malliaris, A. G. 2012. Asset Price Bubbles and Central Bank Policies: The
Crash of the Jackson Hole Consensus in Evanoff, D. Kaufman, G. and
Malliaris, A.G. (editors). New Perspectives on Asset Price Bubbles: Theory,
Evidence and Policy. New York Oxford University Press 407-422.
Malliaris, A. G. 2016. From Asset Price Bubbles to Liquidity Traps in
Malliaris, A.G. Shaw, L. and Shefrin, H. (editors). The Global Financial
Crisis and its Aftermath: Hidden Factors in the Meltdown. New York
Oxford University Press 25-56.
Malliaris, A. G.; Shaw, L.; and Shefrin, H. 2016. (editors) The Global Financial
Crisis and its Aftermath: Hidden Factors in the Meltdown. New York
Oxford University Press.
Minsky, H. 1986. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven Yale
University Press.
Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K. 2009. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of
Financial Folly. Princeton Princeton University Press.
Romer, C. 1990. The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105: 597-624.
Romer, C. 1992. What Ended the Great Depression? Journal of Economic
History 52: 757-784.
Rosengren, E. S. 2011. Defining Financial Stability, and Some Policy
Implications of Applying the Definition Keynote Remarks at the Stanford
Finance Forum Graduate School of Business Stanford University, 3 June.
Taylor, J. B. 2007. Housing and Monetary Policy. National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc., Working Paper #13682.
Williams, J. 2011. Unconventional Monetary Policy: Lessons from the Past
Three Years Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter,
2011-31, October 3.
Yellen, J. 2009. A Minsky Meltdown: Lessons for Central Bankers Presented
at the 18th Annual Hyman Minsky Conference of the State of the U.S. and
World Economies April 16.
Yellen, J. 2014. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability at the 2014 Michel
Camdessus Central Banking Lecture International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C.
Yellen, J. 2017. Financial Stability a Decade after the Onset of the Crisis at
Fostering a Dynamic Global Recovery A Symposium sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 25.

